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1 Introduction
This paper studies the interaction of agentscollateral price beliefs, credit constraint and aggregate
economic activity over the business cycle. One strand of literature, an inuential contribution is
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, henceforth KM), studies the role of credit constraints as an amplication
mechanism generating large and persistent uctuations in output and asset prices. This paper
incorporates imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy and learning about collateral
prices by economic agents into KM showing that learning amplies and propagates shocks to the
economy.
The mechanism of the learning model is as follows. A positive surprise in collateral prices, say
due to a positive productivity shock, brings about agentsoptimism about future collateral prices.
The optimism enhances borrowing capacity, which in turn boosts borrowers collateral demand
and collateral prices. The realized collateral prices reinforce agentsoptimism and lead to further
optimism. Associated with agents shifting expectations and credit expansions/contractions are
non-fundamental uctuations of collateral prices and self-reinforcing rises and falls of aggregate
activities.
An extension of the model considers heterogenous learning between borrowers and lenders and
voluntary default of borrowers possibly arising from the divergence of borrowersand lendersex-
pectations about future collateral prices. This may prevent agents from learning to form Rational
Expectations (RE) which is otherwise possible under homogenous learning. Moreover, the simu-
lation results suggest that bankruptcy on the part of the borrowers arise sooner as they track the
economy faster.
A related paper is Assenza and Berardi (2009, henceforth AB) replacing the assumption of RE in
the basic version of KM by adaptive learning. The paper shows that the optimalityconditions in
AB imply that agentsoptimalchoices are either suboptimal or infeasible. Moreover, it illustrates
the di¤erent and correct learning dynamics.
2 The Model
The model setup is the same as that of AB presented in their section 2 except that shocks to the
farmers productivity are added. The AB model without the productivity shocks is exactly the basic
version of KM except that there are some notational di¤erences, the gatherersproduction function
is assigned a specic functional form G(KGt ) = 2
p
KGt ; and RE is replaced by adaptive learning.
We assume homogenous expectations and learning among borrowers and lenders throughout the
paper except in section 3.3.
Reproducing a few major equations from AB. The ow-of-fund constraint of the farmer (or
borrower) is
qt(K
F
t  KFt 1) +Rbt 1 + cFt = yFt + bt (1)
where qt, KFt  KFt 1, bt 1, cFt , and yFt are land (or collateral) price, investment in collateral holding,
debt holding, consumption and production. The production function of the farmer is
yFt = (a+ t + c)K
F
t 1 (2)
where (a + t)KFt 1 is the tradable part of production and cK
F
t 1 the non-tradable part. t is an
i.i.d innovation with zero mean and constant variance.
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The farmers nancing constraint is
bt  Etqt+1
R
KFt (3)
The maximum loan he can get is the discounted and expected liquidation value of the collateral.
2.1 Optimality conditions
Some assumptions as in KM are made to ensure that the return to investment in collateral holding
is su¢ ciently high, so the farmer prefers to borrow up to the maximum and invest in land. His
optimal consumption is the nontradable part of his production
cFt = cK
F
t 1 (4)
and optimal borrowing
bt =
Etqt+1
R
KFt (5)
Every period his inherited debt1 is
bt 1 =
Et 1qt
R
KFt 1 (6)
Combining equations (1); (4); (5); (6) and the farmers production function (2) delivers the
farmers land demand equation as follows
KFt =
1
t
(a+ qt + t   Et 1qt)KFt 1 (7)
where t = qt   Etqt+1=R is the down payment required to purchase a unit of collateral:
The gatherers (or lenders) land demand equation is
t =
G0(KGt )
R
(8)
where G is the production function of the gatherer. Equation (8) says that the present value of
marginal product of land equals to user cost of land.
The land market clearing condition is
KGt +K
F
t = K (9)
Collateral prices and collateral holding process under RE are determined by equations (7), (8),
and (9) given initial conditions. Under learning solving the collateral prices and collateral holding
process requires additionally agentsbelief updating equations and initial beliefs.
1 (6) is assumed to hold for the initial period and it is true if initially the economy is at the steady state and agents
hold RE beliefs.
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2.2 Incorrect Optimality Conditions in AB
AB replace the assumption of RE in the basic version of KM by adaptive learning. This section
shows that their optimalityconditions imply that agentsoptimalchoices are either suboptimal
or infeasible.
To compare with AB, the productivity shock t is shut down in this subsection. They have a
di¤erent land demand equation for the farmer, which is their equation (5) and reproduced here
KFt =
a
t
KFt 1 (10)
In contrast to equation (7), equation (10) omits capital gains/losses in land holdings (qt Et 1qt)KFt 1.
Under RE equilibrium and deterministic environment, as in the KM model, agentsexpectations
about future land prices realize themselves due to perfect foresight. The current market value of
inherited land from last period qtKFt 1 o¤sets exactly the debt repayment Et 1qtK
F
t 1. The two
collateral demand equations, i.e., equation (7) and equation (10), coincide.
However, under adaptive learning, every period agents expectations about future collateral
prices may not realize during the learning transition. The farmers may make persistent forecast
errors, which produces capital gains/losses in their land holdings and additional variations in their
net worth.
Implicit in AB is that the capital gains/losses are completely absorbed by consumption. This
can be seen more clearly by deriving the implied consumption rule for the farmer in AB. Combining
equation (1), (5), (6), (8), (10), the optimal consumption of the farmer implied by AB can be
derived as follows
cFt = cK
F
t 1 + (qt   Et 1qt)KFt 1 (11)
The implications of equation (11) are as follows. When there is capital gain in the farmers
collateral holding, i.e., qtKFt 1 > Et 1qtK
F
t 1, he will consume the capital gain instead of investing
in collateral holding. He will consume part of the tradable output beyond the nontradable output,
which is suboptimal relative to investing it, because the return to the latter is higher than con-
suming. When facing capital loss, i.e., qtKFt 1 < Et 1qtK
F
t 1, borrowers will consume only part of
nontradable output. This implies further that they invest part of nontradable output in collateral
holdings, which is infeasible given that they are perishable and non-tradable.
2.3 Belief Updating and the Actual Law of Motion
Appendix A shows that linearizing equations (7), (8), and (9) yields
qt = 0 + 1K
F
t 1 + 2Etqt+1 + 3Et 1qt   3t (12)
KFt = 4 + 5qt + 6Etqt+1 (13)
where 0 = a, 1 =
a3R2
2 , 2 =
Ka2R2+1
2R , 3 =   12 [ Ka2R2   1], 4 = K   3(aR)2 , 5 = 2a3R2 , and
6 =   2(aR)3 .
This model economy has the following Minimum State Variable (MSV) RE solution
qt = 	0 +	1K
F
t 1 +qt (14)
KFt = 	2 +	3K
F
t 1 +Kt (15)
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where the parameters are to be determined.
In the learning model agentsPerceive Law of Motion (PLM) is
qt = 0 + 1K
F
t 1 + q;t (16)
KFt = 0 + 1K
F
t 1 + K;t (17)
where 0s are regression residuals. Since beliefs about 0 and 1 are irrelevant for agentsdecisions,
I focus on the evolution of beliefs about 0 and 1: They are revised according to
t = t 1 + gtR
 1
t xt 1(qt 1   0t 1xt 1) (18)
Rt = Rt 1 + gt(xt 1x0t 1  Rt 1) (19)
where xt  (1 KFt 1)0 and t  (0;t 1;t)0. gt is the gain parameter governing the speed of belief
adjustments. As is standard in the literature, two gain sequences are considered: a decreasing
sequence, e.g., gt = 1t ; is used to study the convergence of the learning process and a constant
sequence gt = g > 0; is used for numerical simulation. The latter implies that agents discount old
data and give relative larger weight to recent data.
Conditional expectations are Etqt+1 = 0;t + 1;tK
F
t and Et 1qt = 0;t 1 + 1;t 1K
F
t 1: Sub-
stituting conditional expectations into the model equations (12)-(13) delivers the Actual Law of
Motion (ALM) for collateral prices and collateral holdings under learning
qt = T1(0;t 1; 0;t; 1;t) + T2(1;t 1; 1;t)K
F
t 1 + T3(1;t)t (20)
KFt =
4 + 60;t
1  61;t
+
5
1  61;t
qt (21)
where T1(0;t; 1;t) =
(0+20;t+30;t 1)+21;t
4+60;t
1 61;t
1 21;t 51 61;t
, T2(0;t; 1;t) =
1+31;t 1
1 21;t 51 61;t
and T3(1;t) =
 3
1 21;t 51 61;t
.
3 Learning Dynamics
An unexpected positive impulse to farmers productivity is considered to illustrate the learning
dynamics assuming agents initial belief is at or di¤erent from the RE belief. In addition, this
section conducts E-stability analysis and studies the convergence of real time learning process
under homogeneous learning among borrowers and lenders. An extension of the model considers
voluntary default of borrowers assuming heterogenous learning. This section closes with some
further comments on AB.
3.1 The Mechanism of the Learning Model
Numerical simulations are performed with following parameterization. The farmers productivity
is normalized at one, i.e., a = 1. Following KM, the parameter K is set such that farmers hold
two third of the collateral in the steady state. The gross interest rate is set to 1:06. The stan-
dard deviation of the productivity shock is set to 0:00712. The functional form of the gatherers
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production function implies that the collateral intensity equals to 0:5. The gain parameter is set
to 0.02. This value of the gain implies that observations that are 20 years old receive a weight of
(1  0:002)80 ' 0:20, implying agents do not discount past data too heavily. This is consistent with
the literature which uses gain parameters ranging from 0.007 - 0.05-see, for example, Branch and
Evans (2006), Milani (2007), and Orphanides and Williams (2005).
3.1.1 Dynamic Response
Figure 1 displays Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of land prices, the farmers land demand,
forecasts of collateral prices and lending for 10 years under RE and learning to a 1% positive
impulse to farmersproductivity assuming agentsinitial belief is at the RE value. The line labeled
AB modelcan be skipped for the moment and will be discussed in section 3.4.
The RE dynamics is discussed in KM and briey reviewed here. Following a positive impulse
to the farmersproductivity, their net worth and demand for collateral rise. Collateral transfers
from gatherers to farmers. User cost of collateral rises and so does collateral price. Rising current
collateral holdings enhance the farmersability to invest in following periods, which induces the
persistent stay of the farmerscollateral holdings above the steady state. This reinforces the response
of collateral prices when agents anticipate future user costs are above the steady state. However,
after the impact period, rising user cost chokes o¤ further rises in prices and quantities, so they
converge persistently and monotonically back to the steady state.
Under learning, agents have correct forecast functions for collateral prices initially. In the
impact period, responses of all variables under learning are identical to those under RE. The
learning model generates additional propagation due to belief revisions and the interaction of agents
price beliefs, price realizations and credit limit. After the impact period, a positive surprise in
collateral prices induces an upward belief revision and optimism about future prices relative to RE.
The optimistic expectations about future collateral prices enhance borrowing capacity, so larger
loans are granted by lenders. Equation (7) says that farmers can increase their collateral holdings
when the capital gain is higher than the downpayment (relative to its steady state value a), i.e.,
qt Et 1qt > t a. This boosts collateral prices further up. The realized collateral price reinforces
agents initial optimism and leads to further optimism. The learning model generates prolonged
periods of expansions of prices and quantities. The peak responses of land prices, land holdings
of farmers, collateral price forecasts, and lending under learning are 43.4%, 35.5%, 52.8%, 36.1%
higher than under RE, respectively.2
The reversal of prices and quantities relates to the convergence of the learning process discussed
in the next section. At some point the negative e¤ect of excessive debt repayments dominates such
that collateral price falls short of agentsforecast. This sets a self-reinforcing decline of prices and
quantities in motion. Agents revise their beliefs downward and become pessimistic about future
prices. Based on the pessimism, credit limits are tightened by the lenders, which reduces further
farmersdemand on collateral. The realized prices reinforce agentspessimism and lead to further
downward adjustments of beliefs. Collateral prices and quantities oscillate around the steady state
for many periods and then converge to the steady state.3
2Note in the basic version of the KM model, the steady state leverage ratio (or debt/asset ratio) equals to 1=R
and is very large for R close to 1. A small change in collateral prices will generate large uctuations of collateral
holdings. Nevertheless, this gure can be used to illustrate the di¤erent dynamics between learning and RE.
3The Impulse Response Functions under learning depend continuously on the gain parameter. The larger (smaller)
the gain is, the stronger (weaker) the amplication is and the more (less) likely the oscillatory dynamics happens.
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A number of papers emphasized the importance of cyclical or oscillatory dynamics in RE models,
e.g. Farmer and Guo (1994) and Azariadis, Bullard, and Ohanian (2004). Such dynamics is also
argued as a feature of US data in these papers. Oscillatory dynamics arises in Farmer and Guo
(1994) due to non-convexities and in Azariadis, Bullard, and Ohanian (2004) due to the overlapping
generations structure. More closer to here, oscillatory dynamics has been found as a prominent
feature of scal policy changes in standard Real Business Cycles models with adaptive learning in
Mitra, Evans, and Honkapohja (2013).
3.1.2 Impact of Initial Beliefs
The two upper (lower) plots of gure 2 display the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of land prices
and farmerscollateral holdings following a 1% positive productivity impulse assuming agentsinitial
belief is 0.1% higher or more optimistic (0.1% lower or more pessimistic) than the RE belief.4
Relative to the RE value as initial belief, optimistic initial belief amplies further the response.
The impact response of prices and qunatities is larger than under RE, and the peak response of
collateral prices and farmers land holdings under learning is 402% and 359% higher than under
RE, respectively. When agentsinitial belief is pessimistic, its negative e¤ect dominates the positive
e¤ect of the productivity impulse so that prices and quantities fall initially. After a few periods they
start to increase and overshoot the steady state, with the peak response higher than that under
RE. For both scenarios, prices and quantities oscillate around the steady state and converge to the
steady state eventually.
3.2 E-stability and Real-time Learning
Appendix B shows that the E-stability of the REE (12)-(13) requires
Ka2R2 >
2 R
R
Following KM, the gatherers production function G is assumed to satisfy G0 > 0; G00 <
0; G0(0) > aR > G0(K),5 which ensure that both farmers and gatherers are producing and holding
(positive amounts of) collateral at the steady state. Given that G(KGt ) = 2(K
G
t )
1
2 ; farmerscollat-
eral holding at the steady state is positive implies that KF = K   (aR) 2 > 0: Appendix B also
shows that Ka2R2 > 1 ensures the stationarity of the RE solution.
Note the coe¢ cients in agentsPLM for land and on shocks t will automatically converge to
the RE value as long as the parameters in equation (16) converge to RE value. The following
proposition summarizes the E-stability result.
Proposition 1
For all admissible parameters in  =

(a;R; K) : Ka2R2 > 1; R > 1
	
, the REE for the economy
represented by equations (12) and (13) is E-stable.
Next I consider real-time learning of the REE (14)-(15). The model is mixed dating and Appen-
dix C uses the stochastic approximation theory to prove the convergence of least-squares learning.
4Due to space constraints, the responses of collateral price forecasts and lending are not reported here. But their
dynamics is qualitatively similar to prices and collateral holdings.
5See equation (5) on p. 219 of KM
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Proposition 2
The REE (14)-(15) is stable under least-squares learning if the model parameters satisfy the
E-stability conditions given in Proposition 1.
3.3 Heterogeneous Learning and Voluntary Default
In previous sections, homogenous expectations are assumed for all agents. This section considers
heterogeneous expectations and learning among farmers and gatherers. General forms of hetero-
geneity are considered in the literature. For example, Honkapohja and Mirtra (2005, 2006) consider
scenarios with di¤erent initial beliefs, learning algorithm, gain parameter sequences, or a mixture
of them, etc, and study the convergence of adaptive learning towards RE. The paper considers a
specic form of heterogeneity, i.e., di¤erent gain parameters.
The setup of this section is the same as in Section 4 and 5 of AB. Borrowers will choose to
default voluntarily when their expectation about future collateral price falls below the expectation
of lenders.6 Under heterogeneous expectations, the borrowersland demand equation is
KFt =
(a+ t + qt   qe;Gt 1)
e;Gt
KFt 1
The lendersland demand equation is the same as under homogenous learning, i.e., e;Gt =
G0(KGt )
R .
I explore numerically how the timing of bankruptcy decisions by borrowers depends on several
key parameters of the model under heterogeneous learning. The simulation is performed as follows.
The initial belief (in period 1) of borrowers and lenders is set to the RE value and the economy is
assumed to start from the steady state. The lendersgain parameter is set to 0.01. The average
timing of bankruptcy of the borrowers is calculated under combinations of di¤erent gain parameters
of borrowers ranging from 0.001 to 0.038 and di¤erent standard deviations of productivity shocks
from 1 multiple to 1/10 of 0.00712 based on 5000 repetitions. In each repetition the timing of
default is recorded as the rst period when the expectation of borrowers falls below that of lenders.
Note in two scenarios borrowers will choose to default immediately, i.e., in period 2, in this
model. The rst scenario is a positive initial shock combined with a smaller gain parameter of
borrowers. This leads to that borrowers revise their beliefs upward by less than lenders and hence
have lower price expectations in the second period. The second is a negative initial shock combined
with a larger gain parameter of borrowers. In this case, borrowers will revise their beliefs downward
by more than those by lenders, so borrowers expectations will fall below lenders in the second
period.7
Table 1 reports the average timing of default with excluding the cases of immediate default.8
6 It can be shown that correcting the farmers land demand equation does not a¤ect their voluntary bankruptcy
decisions and the bankruptcy condition in AB.
7 In the rst paragraph of page 1164 in AB, they mentioned that the farmer pays a cost C for a preliminary contract
to buy a house such as in Italy but assume C = 0 in their paper. In a more realistic setting, all or at least most
immediate defaults may be eliminated if the farmer need to pay a su¢ ciently large C > 0; because then the farmer
will decide to default voluntarily when their expectation about future land price falls by more than certain positive
amount below the expectation of the lender. One may conjecture that the average timing of default calculated below
is an increasing function of C due to a tighter bankruptcy condition. The paper follows AB and does not pursue the
case with C > 0.
8The cases of immediate default account for about half of the repetitions. The average timing of default without
excluding those cases displays a qualitatively similar pattern as that with excluding them. Not surprisingly, not
removing the immediate defaults will shorten the average timing of default for all parameterizations.
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In Panel A (B) borrowers have a smaller (larger) gain parameter than lenders. First, the average
timing of default depends negatively on the gain parameter of borrowers holding other parameters
constant. Put it di¤erently, bankruptcy arises sooner as the borrowers track the economy faster.
This can be seen from each row of both panels in table 1, which reports the average timing of default
varying the borrowersgain parameter. This result is robust for di¤erent size of productivity shocks,
or di¤erent gain parameters of lenders.9 Second, the timing of default depends non-monotonically
on the variance of the productivity shocks holding other parameters constant. This can be seen
from each column of the table varying the size of productivity shocks.
3.4 Further Comments on AB
It appears that the E-stability condition in proposition 1 is the sameas that in AB. However,
in their proposition 1 AB claimed the condition Ka2R2 > 1 comes from the stationarity of the
land process. However, proposition 1 in the paper comes from the assumptions on the production
function G which ensures that both borrowers and lenders hold nonnegative amounts of collateral
at the steady state omitted by AB. Moreover, the stationarity of the farmers collateral process is
satised automatically.
Despite the incorrectness of AB optimality conditions, a productivity impulse is considered
to illustrate the di¤erent dynamics of the models with AB optimalityconditions and with correct
ones. Figure 1 shows that the impact response of prices and quantities under AB is much dampened,
which is due to not only the smaller initial response but also consuming the capital gains instead of
investment weakens the ability to reinforce agentsbeliefs in subsequent periods. The price decline
in AB is less prompt because the capital losses are absorbed by reducing consumption so that the
farmersnet worth and collateral demand fall by less.
In the last paragraph of their page 1167, AB claimed that The bigger is the di¤erence in the gain
parameters and the greater the variance of the productivity shocks, the sooner bankruptcy arises.
Simulations in the previous section show that the average timing of default depends negatively on
the gain parameter of borrowers instead of the gain parameter di¤erence between borrowers and
lenders and non-monotonically on the variance of the productivity shocks.10
4 Conclusions
The paper shows that the interaction of agentsprice beliefs, price realizations, and credit limits
generates interesting and realistic learning dynamics. Positive developments of fundamentals, say,
due to a positive productivity impulse, lead to positive surprises in collateral price forecasts and
bring about agents optimism about future prices. The optimism enhances borrowing capacity
and collateral demand and boosts collateral prices. The realized collateral prices reinforce agents
optimism and lead to further optimism. In addition, simulations show that optimistic initial belief
amplies further the e¤ects of the productivity impulse.
9The results for di¤erent gain parameters of lenders/borrowers or for ner grids of the gain parameter of the
borrowers are available upon request.
10The simulation results here suggest that their claim is not true in the learning model with correct optimality
conditions. For example, comparing (1,1) element with (2,2) element of Panel A of table 1. The former (latter)
reports the average timing of default when both the variance of the productivity shocks and the gain di¤erence
are larger (smaller), i.e., the standard deviation is 0.00712 (0.9*0.00712) and the gain di¤erence is 0.009 (0.008).
The average defaulting time under the former (latter) is 20.156 (20.083). This contradicts ABs claim. More such
examples can be found in the table.
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The paper also shows that agents can learn to form RE under homogenous least-squares learning
in this credit-constrained economy. However, they may be prevented from learning the REE when
agents have heterogeneous learning rule. This is because borrowers may choose to default voluntarily
when their expectations fall below the lenders, which leads to the disruption of the debit/credit
relationship. It is shown that bankruptcy on the part of the borrowers arises sooner as they track
the economy faster.
Overoptimism is belived to have contributed signicantly to the build-up of the US housing
boom in 2000s and associated macro dynamics, such as rising household debt and consumption
boom, etc. As an application, the current model may be extended to analyze the role of the
interaction of agents beliefs and credit constraints in producing the price boom and associated
aggregate uctuations during the housing cycle.11
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Appendix
A Linearizing the Learning Economy
Assuming that the gatherers production function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., G(KGt ) = 2
p
KGt , equation
(8) leads to KGt = (Rt)
 2. The steady state of the system is a = , q = aRR 1 , K
G = (aR) 2 and
11Kuang (2013) provides such an example.
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KF = K  (aR) 2. I proceed to linearize the system around its steady state. Rearranging equation
(7),
KFt 1 =
KFt t
a+ qt   Et 1qt + t
=
( K   1(Rt)2 )t
a+ qt   Et 1qt + t
=
K(qt   1REtqt+1)2   1R2
(a+ qt   Et 1qt + t)(qt   1REtqt+1)
(22)
Linearizing the right hand side of equation (22),
KFt 1 ' K  
1
a2R2
+ [
2 K
a
+ ( 
K
a
+
1
a3R2
) + ( 
K
a
+
1
a3R2
)](qt   aR
R  1)
+[ 2
K
aR
+ (
K
aR
  1
(aR)3
)](Etqt+1   aR
R  1) + [
K
a
  1
a3R2
](Et 1qt   aR
R  1)
= K   1
(aR)2
+
2
a3R2
(qt   aR
R  1) 
1
aR
[ K +
1
(aR)2
](Etqt+1   aR
R  1)
+
1
a
[ K   1
a2R2
](Et 1qt   aR
R  1) +
1
a
[ K   1
a2R2
]t
Rearranging the above equation yields equation (12). Combining KGt = K  KFt and equation (8)
leads to
KFt = K   (Rqt   Etqt+1) 2
' K   1
(aR2)
+
2R
(aR)3
(qt   aR
R  1) 
2
(aR)3
(Etqt+1   aR
R  1)
Collecting the coe¢ cients in the above equation delivers equation (13).
B Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting the conditional expectations into equations (12)-(13) yields the ALM for the farmers
land demand
KFt = 4 + 5qt + 6Etqt+1
= 4 + 5qt + 6(0 + 1K
F
t )
=
4 + 60
1  61
+
5
1  61
qt (23)
and the ALM for collateral prices (using equation (23))
qt = 0 + 1K
F
t 1 + 2Etqt+1 + 3Et 1qt   3t
= 0 + 1K
F
t 1 + 2(0 + 1K
F
t ) + 3(0 + 1K
F
t 1)  3t
= T1(0; 1) + T2(0; 1)K
F
t 1 + T3 (1) t (24)
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where T1(0; 1) =
(0+20+30)+21
4+60
1 61
1 21 51 61
, T2(0; 1) =
1+31
1 21 51 61
; and T3 (1) =
 3
1 21;t 51 61;t
.
Combining (23) and (24) yields
KFt =
4 + 60
1  61
+
5
1  61
T1(0; 1) +
5T2(0; 1)
1  61
KFt 1 +
5T3 (1)
1  61
t (25)
At the xed point, we have 1 = T2(0; 1) = 	1, which yields 	1 =
a3R2
2
Ka2R2+1
2   1R
: Note 0 does
not appear in T2. So only two partial derivatives, @T2@1 j0=	0;1=	1 and
@T1
0
j0=	0;1=	1 , matter
for the E-stability conditions. Rearranging T2(0; 1)
T2(0; 1) =
1 + 31   161   3621
1  61   251
The partial derivative @T2@1 j0=	0;1=	1 is
@T2
@1
j0=	0;1=	1 =
(3   16)  2361
1  61   251
+
(6 + 25)[1 + 31   161   3621]
(1  61   251)2
j0=	0;1=	1
=
(3   16)  2361 + 1(6 + 25)
1  61   251
j0=	0;1=	1
=
3   16   36	1
1  6	1   25	1
The E-stability for the MSV RE equilibrium requires that @T2@1 j0=	0;1=	1 < 1, which is equivalent
to
Ka2R2 >
2 R
R
The other partial derivative @T10 j0=	0;1=	1 is
@T1
0
j0=	0;1=	1 =
(2 + 3)  361
1  (6 + 25)1
j0=	0;1=	1
=
(
Ka2R2+1
2   1R )(
Ka2R2+1
2  
Ka2R2 1
2 ) 
Ka2R2 1
2R
Ka2R2+1
2   1R  
Ka2R2 1
2R
The E-stability for the MSV RE equilibrium requires that @T10 j0=	0;1=	1 < 1, which is equivalent
to
Ka2R2 >
2 R
R
To sum up, the E-stability for the MSV RE equilibrium requires that Ka2R2 > 2 RR .
The stationarity of the borrowers collateral holding process (25) at REE requires 5	11  6	1
 < 1
which is equivalent to Ka2R2 > 1:
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C Proof of Proposition 2
The model is mixed-dating, similar to the model of Adam, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006) which
study the convergence of the real time learning process. The proof here follows them. Note agents
belief about the parameters in the evolution of farmerscollateral holdings, i.e., 0 and 1; does not
appear in the ALM under learning. The proof focuses on the evolution of agentsbelief about the
parameters in the PLM for collateral prices. They are updated according to
0;t
1;t

=

0;t 1
1;t 1

+ gtS
 1
t 1

1
KFt 2

(qt 1   0;t 1   1;t 1KFt 2) (26)
and 
0;t 1
1;t 1

=

0;t 2
1;t 2

+ gt

gt 1
gt

S 1t 1

1
KFt 3

(qt 2   0;t 2   1;t 2KFt 3) (27)
for the periods t and t  1
A timing change is made, i.e., St = Rt+1; so the moment matrix evolves according to
St = St 1 + gt

gt+1
gt
 
xt 1x0t 1  Rt 1

(28)
and
St 1 = St 2 + gt
 
xt 1x0t 1  Rt 1

(29)
where gt = 1t and xt = (1 K
F
t 1)
0.
To write the entire system as a Stochastic Approximation Algorithm (SRA), I next dene
t = (0;t; 1;t; 0;t 1; 1;t 1)
0,
Bt =
0@ tvec St
vec St 1
1A and Xt =
0BB@
KFt 1
KFt 2
KFt 3
1
1CCA
With this notation the equations for parameter updating are in the standard form
t = t 1 + gtQ(t; t 1; Xt) (30)
where the function Q(t; t 1; Xt) is dened by (26)-(29). The ALM for farmerscollateral holdings
can be expressed in terms of general functional notation as
KFt = C1(t) + C2(t)K
F
t 1 + C3(t)t
The state vector Xt evolves according to0BB@
KFt 1
KFt 2
KFt 3
1
1CCA =
0BB@
C2(t 1) 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
1CCA
0BB@
KFt 2
KFt 3
KFt 4
1
1CCA+
0BB@
C1(t 1) C3(t 1)
0 0
0 0
1 0
1CCA 1t 1

or
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Xt = A(t 1)Xt 1 +B(t 1)vt (31)
where vt = (1 t 1)0:
System (30) and (31) is a standard form for SRAs. The associated ODEs for the model are
d
d

0
1

= S 1M()

T1()  0
T2()  1

dS
d
= M()  S
d
d

10
11

= S 1M()

T1()  10
T2()  11

dS1
d
= M()  S1
where the temporary notation of variables with/without the superscript refers to the t and t   1
dating in system (26)-(29) and M() data moment matrix when beliefs are xed at . A variant
of standard arguments shows that stability of the ODE is governed by the stability of the smaller
ODE
d
d
0BB@
0
1
10
11
1CCA =
0BB@
T1()  0
T2()  1
T1()  10
T2()  11
1CCA (32)
Denote  the xed point or the RE belief. The Jacobian matrix of (32) evaluated at the xed
point  is 0BBBB@
@T1
@0
@T1
@1
@T1
@10
0
0 @T2@1
0 @T2
@11
@T1
@0
@T1
@1
@T1
@10
0
0 @T2@1
0 @T1
@11
1CCCCA
j=
It can be shown that two eigenvalues of the matrix are zeros and the rest two are

@T2
@1
+ @T1
@11

j= and
@T2
@0
+ @T1
@10

j= : Note

@T2
@1
+ @T1
@11

j= < 1 and

@T2
@0
+ @T1
@10

j= < 1 are exactly the E-
stability conditions, hence we have proposition 2.
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Figure 1: Response to 1% positive productivity impulse
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Figure 2: Response to 1% positive productivity impulse: di¤erent initial beliefs
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Table 1: Dependence of the average timing of default of borrowers on borrowersgain parameter
and the size of the productivity shocks
Panel A: Borrowers have smaller gain parameters
STD Borrowers gain parameter
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009
1 20.156 20.151 20.123 20.058 20.055 20.052 20.021 20.006 19.999
0.9 20.112 20.083 20.078 20.063 20.050 20.036 20.029 20.010 20.005
0.8 20.067 20.065 20.049 20.043 20.040 20.029 20.007 19.895 19.893
0.7 20.073 20.064 20.033 20.027 19.909 19.897 19.889 19.888 19.865
0.6 20.051 19.968 19.908 19.901 19.890 19.874 19.871 19.861 19.859
0.5 19.975 19.946 19.927 19.924 19.901 19.880 19.869 19.805 19.795
0.4 20.002 19.949 19.925 19.905 19.880 19.871 19.854 19.815 19.698
0.3 20.003 19.997 19.979 19.938 19.924 19.727 19.722 19.714 19.659
0.2 19.954 19.896 19.759 19.737 19.714 19.678 19.664 19.658 19.640
0.1 19.831 19.810 19.771 19.762 19.753 19.717 19.715 19.650 19.638
Panel B: Borrowers have larger gain parameters
STD Borrowers gain parameter
0.011 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.035 0.038
1 18.070 18.008 17.951 17.900 17.848 17.823 17.727 17.678 17.645 17.502
0.9 18.117 18.051 18.023 17.964 17.919 17.862 17.837 17.827 17.783 17.746
0.8 18.212 18.180 18.089 18.003 17.989 17.907 17.871 17.846 17.825 17.799
0.7 18.278 18.198 18.178 18.162 18.102 17.937 17.801 17.762 17.741 17.735
0.6 18.311 18.241 18.217 18.096 18.078 18.008 17.917 17.888 17.769 17.756
0.5 18.293 18.262 18.175 18.148 18.137 18.061 17.981 17.926 17.919 17.788
0.4 18.394 18.346 18.325 18.185 18.144 18.042 17.933 17.905 17.781 17.768
0.3 18.435 18.321 18.257 18.245 18.163 18.085 18.044 17.823 17.798 17.767
0.2 18.629 18.423 18.380 18.253 18.174 18.149 18.022 17.890 17.770 17.733
0.1 18.638 18.600 18.469 18.385 18.321 18.131 18.051 17.972 17.842 17.808
The average timing of default is calculated for di¤erent combinations of borrowersgain parameter
and di¤erent sizes of the productivity shocks based on 5000 repetitions. The lenders gain
parameter is set to 0.01. The standard deviation of the productivity shocks (column STD) ranges
from 0.1 to 1 multiple of 0.00712. For each repetition, the timing of default is recorded as the rst
period when the expectation of borrowers falls below that of lenders.
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